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BAD NEWS AND GOOD NEWS
By JOHN W. REED
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School

I have been asked to visit with you about some of my
current interests in the evidence field, in which I teach.
When you invite an academic lawyer to speak at your
meeting , you obviously expect of him something other than
the latest hot tips on trial strategy and tactics, something
other than a speech entitled "Reflections on My Last Eleven
Victories in Court." Others can do that for you, probably
at lunch-or, even better, at cocktails, with the successes
more impressive and the defeats more forgivable under the
influen ce of an ounce or two of alcohol.
Instead, you expect of me some analysis of doctrine or
some explanation of trend or philosophy. The reason you
do not expect more is that you know that as an
academician I deal with students and books rather than
clients and cases and that, therefore, l know relatively little
about the real world of trial practice. And, of course, you
are right. The American system of legal education has
tended to separate the schools from the bar. Although I
believe that on the whole our schools do a good job of
preparing men and women for professional careers at the
bar, I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
schools would dq a better job if there were more coopera·
tive efforts between the schools and the bar. This is
singularly true in the area of evidence and trial practice. If
you will indulge me a few more moments of this prologue,
let me explain why this is so.
Law schools do one thing superbly well: they teach the
intellectual skills of reasoning, of distinction drawing, of
deductive and inductive logic, of analysis and synthesis.
These are heavily verbal skills, at least in the context in
which lawyers employ them, and students are tested for
their mastery of th� skills by written examinations. If one
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of our seminar at Michigan and of the enthusiastic and
affirmative response from all three parties-students, prac
titioner, and teacher. I urge you to develop the acquaint
ance of the appropriate teacher and offer your services in a
similar enterprise. The trial bar of tomorrow will be the
better for it, and (as a not inconsequential by-product) you
may have some effect on the style of legal education in this
country.
As for my principal topic, it was suggested that I deal
with subject matter in the field of evidence. That surely
means the Federal Rules of Evidence, the freshest evidence
development around. The Conference Committee version of
the bill was passed by both houses of Congress on the night
of December 18, 1974. The President signed the bilJ on
January 2, and the rules will take effect on July I, 1975.
Copies of the final bill are not yet available, but that is of
little matter because I do not intend to report and analyze
individual rules. You will be doing that in continuing legal
education programs of one kind or another back home in
the months ahead. Rather, I want to put the new rules in
perspective and to suggest their implications for the future
of trial practice and of the adversary system.

First, let me refresh your recollections about the
history of evidence codification in the United States.
Although some evidence rules are generally statutory, for
example, business records as evidence, some privileges
(doctor-patient, priest-penitent), and dead man statutes,
there has not been throughout our nation's history any
significant codification of the law of evidence except
California's in the 19th Century. Our evidence principles are
essentially common law.
In practice this has led to much diversity. Even in a
given state, particular rules may be hard to ascertain. One
Michigan judge says, only slightly exaggerating, that he
cannot find applicable rules and so he simply keeps a copy
of McCormick on his bench and rules accordingly. (His
practice recalls the instance of the judge who was discovered
by some lawyers at his bar to be ruling according to the
"card method." At the beginning of a case he would place
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a well shuffled deck of cards face down on the bench and
assign in his mind the color red to one party and black to
the other. Whenever an objection was made he would turn
up the next card and rule accordingly. A committee of the
bar was appointed to call on the judge and remonstrate
with him. He was embarrassed to have been found out and
apologized, explaining that he had not done very well in the
Jaw school evidence course, which was not very good
anyway . He agreed that his procedure was unfortunate and
promised to bu y
. a copy of McCormick, keep it at hand,
and rule accordingly. To show his good faith he tore up the
deck of cards and threw them in the wastebasket. The
Commit tee members thanked him and left with handshaking
and bonhomie all around. A fortnight later, the committee
called on him again and presented him with a new deck of
cards.)
Other than the California experience with the Field
Code of Evidence, there was no important codification
attempt until the J 930's, at the time the American Law
Institute was engaged in its orgy of restating the law.
Because of the heterogeneity of evidence rules and because
of belief that revision rather than clarification was called
for, the ALI decided that a model code was to be preferred
to a restatement, and in 1942 it promulgated the Model
Code of Evidence. The product of Professor Edmund
Morgan and a committee of distinguished teachers and
appellate judges, the Model Code was elegant and forward
Jookin� It was, however, adopted nowhere, primarily be
cause 1t was thought to represent too dramatic a change
from precedents. Some of its flaws probably stemmed from
the failure to include in the committee membership ex
perienced trial lawyers and trial judges.
Later, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, concluding that the need for reform in
the field of evidence remained, sought to produce rules that
had a better chance of acceptance . The resulting Uniform
Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the Conference in
1953. These rules, produced by Professor McCormick of
Texas and a committee that included trial judges and
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lawyers, were more modest in their changes. They made
some headway, with a degree of acceptance in states such as
Kansas (the chairman of the drafting committee had been a
Kansas triaJ judge), Utah, and New Jersey. The rules also
generated considerable interest and discussion even where
not adopted, but codification and refonn were still glacially
slow.
In the l 960's the Judicial Conference of the United
States recommended the development of rules of evidence
for the federal courts. The Chief Justice appointed an
advisory committee, with Professor Edward Cleary, then of
Illinois and now of Arizona State, as reporter. The com
mittee prepared and circulated several drafts of proposed
rules. The final draft was adopted and "prescribed" by the
Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, with Mr. Justice
DougJas dissenting on the ground that the Supreme Court
does not have rule-making power in evidencece matters.
Moreover, he said, in effect, ..They're not ours," being the
product of an advisory committee. The rules were trans
mitted to Congress as required by the Rules Enabling Act.
In early 1973, however, Congress balked and enacted a law
that prevented the rules from becoming effective unless and
until Congress enacted them.
The House Judiciary Committee, in that pre-Watergate
time, held extensive hearings and produced a bill that made
many changes from the Supreme Court's version, almost all
of them in the direction of conforming the new rules to
existing practice. The House passed its version on February
6, 1974, and the Senate then went to work. In October the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported out its version of the
bill, which was passed by the Senate in November. The
differences from the House bill were relatively few, but
those differences tended to move back toward the Supreme
Court version-which is to say, restored some of the modest
reforms that would have been denied by the House version.
The Conference Committee reached agreement on a statute
close to the Senate version and on December 18 , 1974, the
law was passed, with President Ford signing it on January 2.

It seems safe to predict that many states will foJlow
suit in order to have consistent practice between state and
federal courts, even as they have followed the lead of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, some have jumped
the gun, e.g., Wisconsin, which has aJready enacted the
Supre me Court version of the rules. My own state of
Michig an is launching a study of the desirability of adopting
evidence rules identical with or closely similar to the new
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Now, during the years of this codification process,
another development was talcing place-a development with
which you are aJJ familiar. I refer to the gradual but
perceptible modification of the adversary system. I do not
mean to over-dramatize the situation, but I think that a
legal historian some decades hence wiJJ perceive the post
war years (and I refer, of course, to World War II, our war)
as a time of significant erosion of the adversary system.
There has been an assimilation of some o f the features of
the Continental system of litigation, technically known as
inquisitorial in distinction to adversary. In that other
system, as you know, the judge plays a larger role than he
does in traditional British and American practice, and a
much larger role than in American practice from the
Jacksonian era to about 1940.
During the last thirty-five years or so, we have seen a
diminution of adversariness in our courts. You know the
changes as weJI as I:

(I) For example, the discovery and pretrial
procedures typified by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-the system of laying almost alt of one's
cards on the table;
(2) For example, the widespread abolition of
party voir dire of jurors and the substitution of
voir dire from the bench (and-a related develop
ment, I think-reduction in jury size);
(3) For example,
complex litigation;

judicial

management

of
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Adversariness

(4) For example, the apparently widespread
tendency of judges to increase the employment of
their historic but little used
and even to call, witnesses.

power to question,

Each of you can add illustrations of this trend better than
I, because you live with it week in and week out.
Of

course,

I

do

not

laud

everything

about

the

ad

versary system, and 1 certainly deplore its excesses where
lawyer self-discipline is weak or lacking. But I sincerely
believe that in a world of imperfect men, a world of
non-angels, the application of contending forces is pro
ductive of ..truer" and more just determinations of contro
versies than is any system

pits

contending

points

of

view against

each other, and point of view does make enormous
difference. Perhaps you recall the familiar illustration of the
diary entries made by the young woman on a Caribbean

dependent on magisterial wisdom

and probity.
I recently conferred with a group of parole board
members, their hearing officers, and supporting staffs. They
were trying to determine what procedures to use in parole
matters in order to comply with the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Morrissey v. Brewer. They have been
performing their tasks under guidelines that seek to balance
the welfare of the individual prisoner and the security of
the general public. They have been doing so, however, with
limited or no input from the parolee or his counsel (if any),
whereas the new standards wilt require a considerable degree
of adversariness, particularly in revocation hearings. These
good men and women have been doing their work honestly
and diligently; but when they explained to me how they
arrive at their decisions as to whether the parolee has
violated the terms of parole, I was appalled by the extent
to which in this nonadversary setting unchallenged biases,
illegitimate inferences, and paternalism aparently abound.
The training and experience of most judges, of course,
are a good cut above the training and experience of parole
board members and hearing officers. But none of us-judge
or no-is without prejudices and misconceptions, and all of
us err. I submit that the surest way to confound the error
and to expose the prejudice is to subject all assumptions
and assertions to the scrutiny of someone with a contrary
interest-in short, an adversary.

cruise. Her first day's entry said, "I met the Captain and I
believe he is interested in me." The next day's entry read:
"The Captain has asked me to have dinner with him in his
cabin tomorrow night." The third day's entry said: "I went
to the Captain's cabin for dinner, and after dinner he made
advances to me and said that if I did not yield myself to
him, he would sink the ship. I saved all of the passengers
and the crew." Things
point of view.

do

look

different, depending

on

It was quite possible that a modern code of evidence
would carry forward this diminution in the vigor of the
adversary system. Indeed, the ALI Model Code moved in
that direction. But the new Federal Rules are much more
moderate in this regard, and it is here that we come to the
"bad news/good news" point of my topic. The bad news is
that there is a new statutory code of evidence whose dozens
of rules-fifty pages in the Senate draft-you and I are going
to have to become familiar with. Some of these rules
represent no change whatever in existing law, but others will
significantly change the way you will try some lawsuits.
That means some retraining or retreading, which is hard
work. That's the bad news.
Now for the good news: the Federal Rules of Evidence
are well within the spirit of the adversary system. Because
they codify the Jaw and are succinctly stated and readily
available, they may indeed reverse any existing trend toward
giving the judge a free hand and letting the processes of
proof slip further toward the inquisitorial method. In this
regard, they are "conservative" rules, and, in the true sense
of that much abused adjective. they conserve the process we
now have. That's the good news.
Incidentally, to characterize the new rules as "con
servative" is not to praise them unreservedly. In some areas
they "conserve" long-established rules that probably were
not very wise to begin with and have grown no better with
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age. One is reminded of the analogous situation of the man
who was in his doctor's office for a physical examination.
As the patient stood against the wall stripped of his clothes,
the doctor examined him carefully and began measuring his
abdomen with a yardstick. In a puzzled tone the doctor
said:
"As near as I can tell, your navel is about five inches
below where it belongs. Have you had an operation?"
"No," said the patient.
"Well, maybe it's hereditary."
"No, I don't think so."
"Well, then, what do you attribute it to?"
"I don't know, unless it's that for twenty-three years I

have been flag-bearer in my lodge ...
Indeed, to applaud the new rules as conservative is not
to say that all our existing rules are fine and dandy. Many
are not, and the Federal Rules change some of these, most
for the better. Nor is it to say that I am pleased with every
single provision in the new Federal Rules. I think certain
ones are bad, and I am "underwhelmed" by the wisdom of
some others. But I applaud the project; I recognize the
processes of political and professional compromise that were
necessary to get a set of rules at all; and most of all, I am
delighted that, in the field of evidence, the adversary
assumptions have been strengthened on the whole, rather
than weakened. To me, and I suspect to you, that is good
news.
I do not have time to speak of many of the specific
rules, but let me illustrate my thesis with mention of a few.
First, the rules that recognize in the judge considerable
power to affect the development of the case and the finding
of facts are, on the whole, merely continuations of practices
well established, in federal courts at least, and sometimes
generally. 1 refer, for example, to Rule 403, which autho
rizes the judge to exclude relevant evidence:
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"if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
Rule 611 recognizes the authority of the court to:
"exercise reasonnble control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to (I) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and
(3) protect witnesses from harrassment or undue
embarrassment."
And Rule 102 states that:
"These rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."
These limit counsel's freedom to proceed as he might wish;
but they are certainly orthodox, and they are undoubtedly
necessary limitations on free enterprise in the courtroom.
Another illustration of continuing rules that limit what
might be called freedom of competition in the courtroom is
the pair of rules dealing with the court's power to call and
interrogate witnesses, both lay and expert. Surely no one
doubts a judge's power either to call or to question a
witness; Rule 614 recognizes that power, but the committee
report significantly notes that appellate courts may still
reverse when a judge abandons his proper role as judge and
assumes the role of advocate. Even here there is a 'handy
escape hatch for counsel: Rule 614 also makes it explicit
that counsel need not object to the judge's actions (in
calling or interrogating) until the jury "is not presenl" And
Rule 706, calling for court-appointed experts, merely con
tinues the practice under Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of
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Criminal Procedure and extends it to civil cases-a power
that exists, I take it, even without statute. Here too there is
an adversary protection: Rule 706 expressly says that
nothing in the rule limits the parties in calling expert
witnesses of their own selection.
In short, when the Federal Rules have provisions
inhibiting full play of the adversary system, they are merely
codifications of well recognized judicial prerogatives, not
new encroachments. Even here, minor relief has been
granted as I have noted.
The other rules that have any policy bias on this issue
come down pretty much on the side of encouraging
adversariness. Some seem tame in the abstract, but a
comparison of them with the Supreme Court's draft dis
closes that Congress moved firmly in this direction. Let me
offer five illustrations:
Illustration I: Rule 611 retains the classic federal rule
limiting cross-examination to the subject matter of the
direct, plus matters affecting credibility, with the judge
having discretion to permit coverage of additional matters as
on direct. This is the advocate's rule, protecting his order of
presentation of proof. The Supreme Court draft, on the
other hand, had adopted the wide open rule -the judges'
and law professors' rule. Congress, by insisting on the
present rule, opted for adversariness.
Illustration 2. Rule 613 eliminates the requirement of a
foundation for proof of a prior inconsistent statement. You
will recall that typically it is necessary that counsel on
cross-examination bring to the attention of the witness with
some specificity the time, place, and nature of the allegedly
inconsistent statement, as a condition of independent proof
of that inconsistent statement by counsel's own witness
later. This tips counsel's hand and makes difficult the
exposure of the lying or wishy-washy witness. The new rule
merely requires that, in fairness, the witness be afforded an
opportunity at some point to explain or deny the aJlegedly
inconsistent statement. Obviously, that opportunity may be
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delayed until after the inconsistency has been revealed. This
is a pro-adversary rule.
Illustration 3: Rule 607 pennits impeachment of one's
own witness, a procedure not allowed in many courts,
including some federal. Perhaps one might argue that
prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness is the
"pro-adversary position," and that new Rule 607 moves
away from that. But I read it otherwise-as a freeing of
counsel to protect his client even against those whom he
calls and who then disappoint.
Illustration 4: Surprisingly, the Congressional version
elimiriated a rule proposed in the Supreme Court draft that
sought to codify the practice followed by many federal
judges of summing up and commenting on the evidence.
The House Judiciary Committee report noted that the
authority to comment on the weight of evidence and the
credibility of witnesses (an authority not granted to judges
in most state courts) is ..highly controversial." After much
debate, the Committee deleted the rule and said that it
intended "that its action be understood as reflecting no
conclusion as to the merits ... and that the subject should
be left for separate consideration at another time." Until
that "other time" arrives, this lack of a provision on the
point in an otherwise comprehensive evidence code seems to
me to be strongly pro-adversary.
Illustration 5: The treatment of the hearsay rule is the
most important illustration of all. The various proposals for
refonn of the law of evidence almost always have involved
significant alterations to the hearsay rule. Jn extreme form,
these proposals suggested that hearsay should be received for
what it is worth, relying on the ability of jurors to assess
secondhand, uncross-examined narratives. Even the more
moderate reforms proposed that the hearsay exceptions be
replaced with a generic principle of admitting hearsay that
seemed reliable-..the kind of infonnation on which reason
able people rely in the conduct of important matters." It is
fair to say that a major reason for the chill reception given
some earlier reform efforts was the bar's distaste for these
departures. The Federal Rules, on the other hand, have
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retained the familiar pattern of rejecting hearsay (rather
traditionally defined) but admitting it if it falls under one
or more of numerous (about 30) exceptions. Some of these
exceptions are stated traditionally and others are modernized
and liberalized, but all have some foundation in case law. )
do not have the time here to speak of the rule and the
exceptions individually except to note that there are
provisions authorizing the court to admit hearsay not fitting
precisely within the stated pigeonholes but having ..equiva
lent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" if certain
general conditions are met. In context this amorphous
exception is not a major inroad on the hearsay rule.

weakening the adversary aspects of our system of civil
litigation. With their undoubted influence on state practice,
the rules suggest that, during our years at the bar in any
event, we shall continue to seek determinations of fact
based on competing presentations by adversaries, not upon
magisterial inquests. To each of you (and, I believe, to the
public we are sworn to serve) that is indeed good news.

This treatment of hearsay in the Federal Rules is
consistent with the adversary philosophy and represents
another anchor against a drift away. That is so because the
hearsay rule is a fundamental element of adversary pro
cedure. Although it is sometimes said that hearsay is
objectionable because it is typically second- or third-hand,
with a danger of error in reporting, and because it is not
under oath (and there is some merit to both of these
contentions), the essential failing of hearsay evidence is that
the declarant's story is being placed before the jury in order
to prove the truth of that story without cross-examination
of the declarant by the adversary. I think it no exaggeration
to say that the hearsay rule is the "enforcer" of the right
of cross-examination. The hearsay rule and the right of
cross-examination are opposite sides of the same coin. Thus,
a diminution of the hearsay rule is pro tanto a diminution
of the right of cross-examjnation. In a litigation system that
relies heavily on party initiative and gives a party great
latitude in deciding what material to place before the court,
the right of cross-examination is indispensable to the search
for truth. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the
statement being offered to the jury for its belief or disbelief
is uncross-examined. The retaining of the essence of the
hearsay rule is the clearest indication of the pro-adversary
character of the Federal Rules.
In short, I view the new Federal Rules of Evidence as
marking, at the very least, a pause in the process of

